In response to Gettier’s counter examples, Alvin Goldman proposes the "causal theory of knowledge", on the basis of which a person knows some proposition, p, if there is a causal connection between the state of affairs and facts that makes p true and the person's belief in p. The purpose of this article is a comparative study between the classification of propositions into "FACTUAL and external" and the "causal theory of knowledge". The article shows that the "causal theory of knowledge" is not consistent with FACTUAL and external propositions and it also shows this theory is inconsistent with essentials of both ancient and modern logic.Finally, the logic of causal theory of knowledge is introduced and its efficiency WILL be analyzed and criticized.

This paper presents Augmented Monkey Optimization Algorithm (AMOA) applied to solve optimal reactive power problem. Communal behaviour of monkeys has been utilized to model the algorithm. Normally, group monkeys assess the distance from the source to food for foraging behaviour. Local leader renews its most excellent location inside the group, when the food source is not rationalized then the group WILL start probing in different directions for the food sources. Two most important control parameters are Global Leader Limit (GLlimit) and Local Leader Limit (LLlimit) which give appropriate way to global and local leaders correspondingly. Levy flight has been intermingled in the algorithm to enhance the search ability. Proposed AMOA accelerates the exploitation ability that has been tested in standard IEEE 14, 30, 57, 118, 300 bus test systems. The simulation results show the projected algorithm reduced the real power loss comprehensively.

The virtue ethics theory emphasizes various factors such as moral traits and the role of motives in the actions of a moral agent, which are assessed based on the agent's character and analysis of his regret. This theory offers a distinct interpretation of ignorance and introduces a novel perspective on the criteria for assigning blame to behaviors stemming from ignorance. Consequently, this theory suggests the appropriate treatment of individuals who act out of ignorance. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach, this article seeks to ascertain the appropriate response to individuals who act out of ignorance and examines the role of regret and vices of character in determining criminal responsibility from the standpoint of virtue ethics.Based on the research findings, actions resulting from ignorance of particulars are deemed involuntary. When an ignorant individual is not responsible for his ignorance and regrets his inappropriate behavior, he cannot be held criminally responsible. However, if the individual lacks remorse despite his ignorance, he may not be culpable for his lack of knowledge but may still incur anger and resentment. Legally, this resentment can manifest in the form of security measures. When an individual is responsible for his ignorance, he can be blamed for his lack of knowledge, although the actions resulting from his ignorance are not morally blameworthy. Nevertheless, given the significance of social considerations in criminal responsibility, these actions may be subject to reproach based on the requirements of criminal justice, particularly if the individual does not express regret for committing the crime.

The key element in identifying infringements of literary and artistic works is to examine the extent of similarities between the works in question. But in the case of FACTUAL works that consist mainly of unprotected facts, the courts dealing with infringement cases of such works suggest that, given that the ways in which a FACTUAL idea can be expressed are limited, any subsequent expression of that idea may seem substantially similar to the words used by the first author to express the idea. In such cases, a special doctrine enters the analysis - the merger of idea with expression. According to this doctrine, expression can not be protected when the idea can only be expressed in a certain way. The doctrine has a special connection to FACTUAL works; because there are limited ways to express facts that are not per se protected. This raises the fundamental question that considering this particular nature and the prominent role of merger doctrine in excluding similarities, in what circumstances does the infringement of FACTUAL works take place? Due to the unclear status of Iranian law in this regard, the present study seeks to answer this question by using a descriptive-analytical method in examining the performance of judges in infringement cases of various instances of FACTUAL works and concludes that these works accept a different standard for infringement, as only a very close similarity, verging on the identical WILL constitute an infringement.

Logicians divided the quantified predicative propositions into FACTUAL and actual ones. FACTUAL proposition is one in which the subject is criterion for attributing the predicate. Subjects of FACTUAL sort of propositions are of four divisions. In one group the subject is existent so the predicate can be ascribed to all individuals without any assumption or hypothesis. In three others there is no true judgment unless the existence of subject is first assumed. FACTUAL proposition is not reduced to conjunctive conditional proposition though it is coextensive with it for in FACTUAL the judgment is not suspended while in conditional it is.

Short-distance sprinting is a sport that requires full body movement of the legs, abdomen, back, shoulders, and arms with explosive power in a short time. The basic principles of sprinting are relatively simple and governed by the laws of mo-tion, but the way athletes solve mechanical con-straints and utilize degrees of freedom within those constraints is much more complex (1). . . .

The necessity of the compatibility in all elements of logic is something that has never been denied among Muslims intellectuals. Throughout the history of logic, any possible inconsistency in the rules of logic, albeit small, has led to a careful study by Muslim logicians. In the continuation of this process, the present text introduces an important inconsistency in the current views of the logicians. In contemporary opinion, the division of predicative proposition into three categories: actuality, mental, and FACTUAL (with differences in interpretation) has been endorsed by most Islamic logicians and philosophers. It is claimed that this division is independent of the rest of the rules of logic and can be accepted without changing the syllogism expressed in the logical tradition. In this paper, it is presented that elements of the conditional-predicative conjunctive syllogisms can only be accepted if the predicative propositions are FACTUAL. This claim is proved by examining the conditional-predicative conjunctive syllogism by sharing an incomplete part and the middle term is a part of conditional consequence. This part of the syllogism in the tradition of Avicennian logic is considered the most obvious example of conditional-predicative syllogism with a shared incomplete part. Careful examination of the evidence in the books of the Avicennian logicians has shown the validity of our claim.

The debate of WILL and volition has always been an important part of the intellectual and philosophical discourse as a whole. The current essay has studied this issue from the points of view of Ghazali and Spinoza in a comparative context. Spinoza has conceived WILL to be a type of notion while Ghazali considers it a mental quality that deals with preferring one side to the other. It seems that the reason for the disagreement of these two scholars in definition of WILL lies in the fact that Ghazali believes that WILL is one aspect of heart and soul whereas Spinoza includes it among the capabilities of mind. First he regarded WILL as a type of judgment but later due to the fact that judgment is the necessary result of notion he was compelled to consider it a kind of notion. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, an action is volition when it becomes realized out of its nature in the sense that no other internal or external stimulus forces the agent to undertake the action at issue; while Ghazali contends that the criterion for an action’s volitionality (the state of being volitional) is it’s being grounded in WILL.....

In this article, article I intend to consider the explanation of the WILL and the ability of this explanation to answer the difficulties concerning this issue in Aquinas philosophy. He believed that the soul is a substance and its powers are described as accidents for it, namely they don't follow necessarily from the soul's nature. Aquinas accepted Aristotle's idea about the appetitive power as a distinct power of the soul. In this Philosophical system intellectual appetite is distinguished from sensitive appetite, The former is depending on understanding and the latter is related to sensation. The intellectual appetite is named WILL. On the other hand Aquinas believed in free WILL Whose specific sign is choice. Therefore we ought to accept that the WILL is affected not only by intellect but also by sensation, and Aquinas believed it too. But if one describes the WILL as a intellectual appetite he WILL not be able to believe in the free WILL.